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Introduction1
It is not possible to estimate accurately the level of the
requirement for food aid for some year in the future.
Too many uncertain factors influence the final
outcome, including world economic conditions,
fluctuations in world cereal markets, and variations in
growth rates for key variables.
Nevertheless, there are some general principles which
may be used on an annual basis to determine the
current level of a country's need for food aid. Using
these principles and projecting past trends under
alternative scenarips, one can also estimate rough
orders of magnitude for the future requirements of
developing countries in the aggregate, although such
estimates do not represent precise indicators of likely
future requirements in individual countries.2
Quantification of the food aid requirement provides
an upper limit to the amount which could be
effectively utilised. However, for most countries, the
actual demand for food aid is lower than this because
economic conditions and management constraints
restrict the amount which can be put to good use.
Some economic environments are more hospitable
than others to food aid programmes which reach the
poor. In hospitable environments food aid can be
given in two ways. One is to use food aid to create
additional demand, thus avoiding disincentive effects
for domestic agriculture. However, the administrative
costs of demand-creating programmes are usually
high. Either countries must provide scarce manage-
ment skills themselves or rely on expatriate voluntary
agency personnel. This cost imposes one kind of
constraint on the quantity of food aid a country can
use effectively.3
The results reported in this study are drawn from a research report
to be published by the International Food Policy Research Institute
in early 1983.
2 the margin for error is likely to be guite high for an
individual country estimate, this margin can be substantially
reduced by aggregating future outcomes for a large number of
individual countries. The results presented here cover 99 developing
countries, excluding only Indochina and certain of the smaller
island countries of Caribbean and South Pacific on grounds of data
availability, and five small oil-exporting Arab countries on grounds
of exceptionally high per capita incomes.
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Another way is to sell food aid on the open market,
perhaps at subsidised prices for consumers, and use
the proceeds to support farm prices or otherwise
contribute to agricultural development. While disin-
centives resulting from open market sale can be
avoided in the right policy environment, the shift away
from a set of economic policies which use imports to
support a cheap food policy while taxing domestic
agriculture is often politically difficult.
As a practical matter, therefore, increases in food aid
should be phased in gradually, in accordance with a
recipient country's strategy for effective utilisation.
Constraints on donors with respect to developmental
allocation and multi-year programming must also be
loosened before food aid can achieve its full potential
for simultaneously feeding the poor and contributing
to sustained economic growth. This article first
presents a quantification of the maximum food aid
requirement, then goes on to discuss economic and
management constraints and their practical impli-
cations for food aid policy.
Quantifying the Need
Various attempts have been made to suggest criteria
and estimate the need for food aid now and in the
future [USDA 1982; FAO 1981]. The approach
followed here is to estimate total import requirement
under various growth scenarios, and then to estimate
the portion of this which is likely to be met with
commercial imports, based on assumptions about
ability to pay. These assumptions take into account
per capita income levels, trends in export earnings, and
ratios of foreign exchange reserves to total merchandise
imports. The residual between total import require-
ment and estimated commercial imports then
represents the requirement for food aid if consumption
targets are to be met.
For example, in Bangladesh, Brundin estimates the country could
use three or four times as much food aid for food-for-work projects
as is now provided, but concluded th9t management constraints
prevent the government from mounting this additional effort. See
Brundin [1978].
GNP per capita serves as a good proxy for several
criteria that bear on a country's requirement for food
aid. Higher levels of GNP are generally associated
with strong export sectors and hence with capacity to
finance needed cereal imports on commercial terms.
Also, high levels of per capita GNP practically assure
that food supply will be adequate in the aggregate, and
middle levels increase the likelihood that food supplies
will be adequate. Based on data for 1976-78, countries
with a per capita income of $900 or more (in 1977
dollars) should no longer require food aid.4
For middle-income countries (those with per capita
incomes between $300 and $900 in 1977 dollars), per
capita supply availability is one indicator of need, and
export strength is another. Looking first at the
situation in the recent past, the mean for per capita
staple crop production averaged 211 kg per year for all
developing countries in 1976-78, that is, almost 2000
calories per day. In countries at or above the mean,
this amount, if distributed equitably, would be
sufficient to maintain adequate consumption levels in
most countries, even where some portion of the total is
consumed by livestock. The adequacy of the food
supply is also indicated by the total per capita
availability of calories in relation to the FAO! WHO
minimum standard established for each country.
Although this standard has been challenged as being
too high [Srinivasan 1981], and it does not take equity
considerations into account, it serves as a rough guide
as to whether a country has a sufficient food supply to
feed its total population adequately.
Export strength represents the ability of a country to
finance necessary cereal imports on commercial terms.
It is reflected in the performance of the export sector
vis-à-vis the total economy, as measured by the ratio of
export earnings to GNP, and by the size of the foreign
exchange reserve, as measured by the ratio of foreign
exchange holdings to average annual merchandise
imports.5 Again for 1976-78, the mean export!GNP
ratio for all developing countries was 0.324. Countries
with higher ratios could therefore be judged to have
40f the 99 developing countries considered in this analysis, 26 fell
into this category - 5 in Asia, 11 in Latin America, 7 in North
Africa/Middle East, and 3 in sub-Saharan Africa. Higher-income
countries may still face serious balance of payments problems from
time to time, as the case of Mexico in 1982 demonstrates. However,
when such problems arise, the structural adjustments required are
likely to go beyond the scope of the economic support which can be
provided by highly concessional loans for cereal imports. Some
relaxation of credit requirements may, however, be envisioned. The
volume of food aid to higher-income countries amounted to 955,000
tons in 1976-78.
middle-income countries, the export/GNP ratio may
sometimes be misleading, since there is a tendency for smaller
countries to have higher ratios, due to the smaller size of their
internal markets. Where larger countries have low export/GNP
ratios but good export growth rates, their basic strength is captured
instead by the foreign exchange reserve indicator.
relatively stronger export sectors, and countries with
lower ratios could be judged to have relatively weaker
export sectors. Some countries with relatively stronger
export sectors nevertheless exhibit weakness in their
foreign exchange position, as evidenced by a foreign
exchange!import ratio of less than 0.25.
On the basis of these indicators, the 34 middle-income
countries can be classified as follows:
exports or reserves strong, production strong;
exports and reserves weak, production strong;
exports or reserves strong, production weak;
exports and reserves weak, production weak.
Countries where both indicators are strong are
assumed not to need food aid. Countries with high per
capita staple crop production but weak balance of
payments are also assumed not to need food aid. They
may face balance of payments problems if they are
currently importing cereals, or ifper capita intake does
not reflect the adequacy of aggregate supply and they
wish to import to make up the apparent deficiency.
But in both cases, the apparent food problem appears
to be more a problem of distribution and market
performance than of supply availability. Food aid
may be useful in support of activities which will rectify
distribution and marketing problems, but this use is
quite country-specific, and estimation of the need for
such support is not attempted here. Countries with
weak food supply and mixed or weak balance of
payments positions are assumed to need food aid.
However, the amount is constrained by imposing the
condition that food aid will be given only when the
cost of cereal imports adequate to meet nutritional
needs exceeds five per cent of export earnings.6
As economies grow and diversify the structure of their
imports, it is reasonable to expect that the average
ratio of cereal import costs to export earnings will
drop. However, Valdés and Konandreas [1981] have
shown that fluctuations around the mean ratio can be
quite large. By fixing the current average ratio as a
balance of payments criterion for determining
eligibility for food aid, the food aid can be made to
respond automatically to countries' food security
requirements. Also, this criterion assures that
countries will meet their obligation not to substitute
food aid for commercial imports, while being easier to
administer than the current usual marketing require-
ment administered by the FAO Committee on Surplus
Disposal.
In an internal document, 'Grain storage and distribution in the
1980s: an approach paper', the Economics and Policy Division of
the World Bank flotes that for developing countries as a whole, the
proportion of total foreign exchange earnings spent on grain
imports is currently about five to six per cent. Of the 99 countries
covered in this paper, 54 spent less than five per cent of export
earnings on cereal imports, 22 spent five to 20 per cent, and 22
lacked data.
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Among middle-income countries, the strength or
weakness of various indicators may vary fromyear to
year. Food aid programmes should be flexible enough
to respond to these varying needs, providing balance
of payments assistance when required, and with-
drawing food aid when not required. For example,
some countries which demonstrated export strength in
1976-78 might require food aid this year because of
weakness in the international economy and over-
valuation of the dollar.7
For middle-income countries, the amount of food aid
requirement for 1976-78, compared to actual amounts
of food aid received, is shown in Table 1. In all, nine
countries would have needed 4.5 mn metric tons,
compared to 31 countries which actually received
2.7 mn metric tons. For balance of payments reasons,
Egypt would have required more food aid than it
actually received, although the total amount of its
import requirement would have been less. Because of
low per capita intake and balance of payments
problems, Ghana and Peru would have required
substantially more than they received. A cautionary
word is in order with respect to effective utilisation of
estimated requirements when they represent a large
share of consumption. As the next section points out,
large-scale food aid can have disruptive economic
effects unless deliberate offsetting measures are
adopted, particularly when the aid is received as
untargeted balance of payments support. All three
countries mentioned need to examine carefully their
domestic policies vis-à-vis agriculture before turning
to food aid to finance large-scale cereal imports.
All low-income countries are assumed to require food
aid for balance of payments support, even in those few
cases where per capita intake is adequate by
FAO/WHO standards. Since the export sector is still
weak and available foreign exchange is badly needed
for capital goods imports during the early stages of
growth, this seems a reasonable assumption. Also,
reliable data for examining a more precise set of
indicators to determine eligibility for food aid are
often lacking. The amount of the requirement is
estimated as the gap between per capita staple crop
production and imports required to meet the
minimum per capita nutritional standard, with an
allowance for commercial imports equal to two per cent
of export earnings. This last condition forces countries
to accept some responsibility for allocating their own
foreign exchange to cereal imports before becoming
eligible for food aid, without imposing a substantial
burden on their scarce resources.
export strength is weaker in a current year than in previous
years, this should be reflected in a higher than average ratio of cereal
import costs to export earnings, if domestic prices are to be kept
stable. Exceptionally poor local harvests or high world grain prices
would have the same effect.
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Out of the 39 low-income countries shown in Table 1,
only Burma, Burundi, and Madagascar did not
require food aid, and only Bhutan and Uganda did not
receive food aid, in 1976-78. The total received
amounted to 4.3 mn tonnes, with roughly 80 per cent
going to Asia.8 The amount required was far larger,
amounting to 27.3 mn tonnes, but again nearly
80 per cent would go to Asia.
The total is nearly double the 17 to 18.5 mn tons
estimated by FAO as a realistic food aid requirement
for 1985, taking into account both need and
absorptive capacity [WFP 1979]. Nor is the total much
reduced by increasing the ratio of export earnings
which countries pay for commercial cereal imports
before becoming eligible for food aid. Indeed, the
principal reason for the large size of the total
requirement is the five-fold increase for Bangladesh
and the fourteenfold increase for India to meet
nutritional needs.9 Had these countries received
amounts sufficient to eliminate hunger, this estimate
puts their combined requirements at 19 mn tons.
While the actual size of the need may be considerably
less if new, lower estimates of the amount of
malnutrition are correct, there is no question that
significantly larger amounts are needed to alleviate
hunger in these two countries.
Apart from supply considerations, there is reluctance
on the part of bothdonors and recipients to consider
increasing food aid by such large amounts for fear the
donated commodities will increase dependence on
imports and discourage growth in domestic agri-
cultural production. There is also concern that local
markets, ration systems, and targeted distributions
could not handle sudden large increases in commodity
availability. Both issues will be discussed at more
length in the following section. But it may be
mentioned here that among low-income countries,
India and Bangladesh are among the more advanced
in terms of thoughtful consideration of appropriate
price and distribution policies and creation of public
distribution mechanisms which reinforce rather than
hinder the operation of local markets. Also, in
economies which must rely on their rural sectors to
stimulate development, food aid can act as a resource
to promote employment through its effect as a cheap
wage good. Without such an infusion of external aid, it
may not be possible for either country to break the
inflationary spiral which could otherwise eat up any
growth which is achieved.
In recent years there has been a shift in the distribution of food aid
away from Asia, particularly to Africa; see Table 3 of Clay's article.
9Similar results were obtained by USDA [1982] in its estimation of
nutrition-based requirements for 1982-83. Out of a total
requirement of 34.5 mn tons, 12 mn went to India, 7 mn to
Bangladesh, and 9.8 mn to sub-Saharan Africa.
Table ¡
Food aid requirements, 1976-78
middle-income countries
1976-78
actual required
(000 tonnes)
low-income countries
1976-78
actual required
(000 tonnes)
A. Exports or Asia
reserves strong: Bangladesh 1,022 5,205
production strong Bhutan 0 26
Burma 8 0
Total 128 0 India 1,019 13,876
Indonesia 636 516
B. Exports and Nepal 2 225
reserves weak; Pakistan 464 464
production strong Sri Lanka 346 1,030
Total 216 0 Total 3,497 21,004
C. Exports or Latin America
reserves strong;
production weak
Haiti 54 429
Bolivia 31 196 North Africa!
Egypt 1,778 2,527 Middle East
Mauritania 35 138 Afghanistan 31 934
Peru 18 819 Sudan 64 87
Yemen DR 11 146 Total 95 1,021
Zambia 22 28
Other 302 0 sub-Saharan Africa
Total 2,197 3,854 Angola 9 33
Benin 8 66
D. Exports and Burundi 4 0
reserves weak; Central African Republic 2 17
production weak Chad 29 277
Dominican Republic 25 60 Ethiopia 67 1,796
Ghana 57 251 Gambia 9 39
Senegal 74 322 Guinea 29 197
Other 41 0 Guinea-Bissau 17 13
Total 197 633
-
Lesotho
Madagascar
18
8
30
0
2,738 4,487Grand Total Malawi 3 15
Mali 25 153
Mozambique 97 498
Niger 55 190
Rwanda 12 54
Sierra Leone 7 88
Somalia 70 295
Tanzania 120 530
Togo 11 67
Uganda 0 246
Upper Volta 24 237
Zaire 29 84
Total
Grand Total 4,299 27,329
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If present trends continue, what will the picture look
like by 1990? First, the number of higher income
countries increases from 26 in 1976-78 to 42 in 1990,
and the number of countries potentially eligible for
food aid drops from 73 to 57 (see Table 2).b0 Second,
total food imports increase from 75 mn tonnes in
1976-78 to over 175 mn tonnes in 1990, under the
highest-growth scenario.
Nearly 20 mn tons of food aid are required by the 57
potential recipients under the three effective demand
scenarios (see Table 3). Under the nutrition-based
scenario, the total quantity required by eligible
countries in 1990 would be 35 mn tons. However, since
income-generated growth in demand is not included in
this scenario, the total food import figure comes to
only 85 mn tons. Although the nutrition-based food
aid requirement is higher in 1990 than in 1976-78,
some low-income countries, particularly India, show
improvement. Countries with large nutrition require-
ments in 1990 include Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Tanzania,
Zaire, and the landlocked countries of the Sahel.
Whether these countries can absorb and effectively
utilise the quantities they will apparently require
during the coming decade is a much-debated issue.
Nor are the issues involved any less important for
countries whose food aid requirement captures less
public attention.
Economic Constraints
There is still considerable controversy over whether
food aid acts as a disincentive to cereal production in a
developing country. In a closed, self-sufficient
economy with little or no trade, food aid introduced
for open market sale must depress prices. Since food
'°Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam are excluded from the analysis
because of lack of data, but they are potentially large food aid
recipients in both periods.
Table 2
Per capita income by region, in 1977 dollars
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producers in most developing countries do respond to
price changes, the availability of food aid will act as a
disincentive to production unless offsetting policy
interventions are introduced.
However, the pure case of a closed economy where
food aid adds to market supply with no offsetting
policy interventions is not typical of actual conditions
in most countries receiving food aid [Abbot and
McCarthy 19811. For one thing, most developing
countries do trade with the rest of the world, even
though some are virtually self-sufficient in staple
foods. Thus the closed economy model is not
appropriate. In an open economy where trade takes
place, the chances of food aid depressing prices and
discouraging domestic production are much slimmer.
When a country trades, it seeks to keep its domestic
prices in equilibrium with world market prices.
Trading countries which do not regulate imports and
are price-takers in world markets can be expected to
import the quantity required to keep domestic cereal
prices in line with world prices. Cereal imports in such
countries will be price-elastic with respect to world
price, and domestic prices will fluctuate along with
world prices. Since supply and demand will be in
equilibrium at the normal level of commercial
imports, food aid cannot be introduced as an addition
to supply without moving domestic prices away from
equilibrium. To keep domestic prices at their
equilibrium level, commercial imports will therefore
be reduced by the amount of the food aid.
In this situation there is no price disincentive for
domestic producers, but neither is there any additional
demand creation for consumers. The only benefit to
the country is the foreign exchange saving created by
the lower dollar cost of its cereal imports.
1976-78 1990
<300 300-900 > 900 < 300 300-900 > 900
Asia 8 6 5 6 4 9
Latin America 1 12 11 1 5 18
North Africa!
Middle East 2 8 7 2 5 10
sub-Saharan Africa 23 13 3 16 18 5
Total 34 39 26 25 32 42
(no of countries) (no of countries)
Table 3
Cereal imports and food aid requirements in 1990, byregion, four scenarios'
nutrition
income-based based
'All four scenarios are based on estimation of a gap between demand for cereals and domestic production in 1990. They are derived as follows:
Income-based: per capita consumption at 1975 base plus amount necessary to meet income-generated demand at higher levels of per capita income,
assuming high rates of growth in GNP and UN medium variant population growth rates. Production at 1961-78 trend growth rates.
Nutrition-based: per capita consumption at amount necessary to provide 100 per cent of FAO/WHO nutritional minimum, assumingper capita
consumption at 1975 base plus cereal equivalent of calorie gap and projecting to 1990 using UN medium variant population growth rates.
Production at 1961-78 trend growth rates.
Consumption-based: aggregate trend consumption of staple foods minus aggregate trend production of staple crops, projected at 1961-78 growth
rates.
Import-based: trend imports projected at 1961-78 growth rates.
2i receives almost 10 mn tons of food aid under the nutrition-based scenario, but nothing under the other three. Bangladesh also receives nearly
10 mn tons under this scenario, compared to 3-6 mn tons under the other scenarios. Republic of Korea snd People's Republic of China account for
the higher total import figure under the import-based scenario.
'Mexico accounts for 35 mn tons of the total import figure under the import-based scenario, compared to 4 mn tons or less under the other
scenarios. As with Korea and the PRC, this results from applying a high import growth rate to a high volume base.
two large recipients of food aid in North Africa/Middle East are Egypt and Morocco, with Morocco taking nearly Ito 4 mn tons and Egypt 3
to 7 mn tons.
'Under the nutrition-based scenario for Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zaire each account for at least a million tons more than under other
scenarios. In addition, certain Sahelian countries also require additional food aid to meet nutritional requirements. The differences in total import
requirement under different scenarios is accounted for largely by differences in the volume projected for Nigeria.
The majority of developing countries fall into yet
another category, that is, trading countries which
regulate prices. In these countries, the effect of food
aid on demand, price, and production depends
primarily on the nature of government interventions
in domestic food markets.
Sometimes governments are pursuing policies which
distort incentives to farmers quite apart from whether
or not food aid is available. For the most part,
distortions take the form of cheap food policies which
governments pursue on behalf of urban consumers. If
food aid forms a large share of total consumption, its
availability may induce countries to pursue such
policies more vigorously than they otherwise would.
But for most countries food aid does not represent a
very significant share of total staples consumption
(less than five per cent in 81 out of 99 cases).
consumption
based import-based
In these countries other macroeconomic policies such
as overvalued exchange rates, export taxes, procure-
ment quotas at low official prices, and outright fiscal
subsidies provide the means for maintaining low
consumer prices in urban areas.
In other cases, food aid may be used by governments
as a resource to offset the potential disincentive effects
by creating additional domestic demand, financing a
price wedge which provides income support to
farmers, or supporting a stocks programme to even
out seasonal price fluctuations. In fact, if properly
used, food aid can provide an incentive for reducing or
eliminating price distortions rather than reinforcing
them. First, it can be used to create additional demand
for food consumption, and thus reduce the depressing
effect of additional supply on market price. To achieve
the desired effect, the demand-creating mechanism
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imports food aid imports food aid imports food aid imports food aid
million tonnes
Asia2 24.1 7.3 24.4 20.3 30.1 5.5 57.2 5.4
Latin America3 14.6 0 7.2 0 21.2 0.3 59.9 0.2
North Africa/Middle 24.1 3.5 24.4 4.3 42.4 10.1 41.5 8.7
East4
sub-Saharan Africa5 29.2 5.8 28.1 10.8 15.1 3.6 17.8 3.8
Total 92.0 16.6 84.1 35.4 108.8 19.5 176.4 18.1
must be directed at low-income groups, where a high
proportion of any resource transfer is usually used for
food. The form of the transfer may be either food or
cash, and the food aid commodity may be used either
for direct transfer to target groups or for open market
sale. If the latter, the proceeds may be used either for
cash transfers or for purchase of local commodities for
distribution to target groups."
Food aid which is used to support demand creation
among low-income groups has double benefits. First,
it avoids the production disincentive which additional
food sold on the open market might otherwise create.
Second, it makes a positive humanitarian contribution
toward enhancing nutritional status among groups
where the hunger problem is most acute. Even though
some leakage will almost inevitably occur, since
families rarely spend 100 per cent of an income
increment on food, the contribution to improved
quality of life can be substantial [Stevens 1979:199]. In
some countries, this use of food aid is valid only in
certain years when domestic harvests are poor and
relief aid is needed for rural areas. In addition to
meeting immediate food needs, use of food aid to meet
variable food security requirements can contribute to
production stability and long-run growth because
poor farmers no longer have to sell or mortgage their
capital assets to pay for tomorrow's food.
In other countries, chronically malnourished groups
may require supplementary food for some period of
time. In an economic environment which is favourable
to labour-intensive development, food aid targeted at
these groups can provide a wage good which enables
supply to keep pace with demand without inflationary
pressure [Mellor 1979]. Eventually, as growth
continues, the aid can be phased out and replaced with
domestically-produced or commercially-impgrted
supplies.
For a variety of reasons, demand-creation may not
always be the preferred use of food aid. First,
administrative mechanisms for reaching target groups
in rural areas are frequently non-existent or very
costly. Second, given their resource limitations, many
governments attach more importance to stimulating
domestic production than to alleviating chronic
malnutrition. Third, if there are to be demand-
creating subsidies for food consumption, many
governments find it difficult to offer these to the
voiceless poor while denying them to the more vocal
and politically powerful middle classes.
'There is some evidence that when transfers are given in the form of
food, the demand-creating effect wilt be greater than when they are
given in the form of cash, but research in this area is still too new for
definite conclusions to be drawn.
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An alternative strategy for using food aid effectively
takes these factors into account. It entails creating
additional demand either by fixing official retail prices
at subsidised rates or by forcing domestic market
prices below world market prices by using food aid
commodities as an additional source of supply for
open market sale. To prevent a disincentive effect on
production, this policy of subsidising consumer prices
must be offset by a policy which fixes producer prices
at a level higher than that established by the market.
Since the food aid represents a free or low-cost
resource to government, most, if not all of the funds
generated by open market sales can be used to finance
this price wedge. Other uses of counterpart funds are
possible, but none has as clear-cut and immediately
stimulative effects in a situation where the food aid
represents additional supply and is used to support a
cheap food policy for consumers [Krishna 1967].
These other uses of counterpart funds are suitable in
situations where market prices are not regulated, food
aid is not additional, and its value is primarily that of a
budget resource. Consumer subsidies coupled with
producer price supports and targeted distribution
programmes are not mutually exclusive. Especially for
low-income countries, some combination of the two
probably represents the optimum use of food aid.
Another possibility with which some countries are
experimenting entails using food aid to support the
creation of working stocks and food security reserves.
This requires the investment of complementary
resources in storage and transport facilities, and the
operation of a government procurement and price
support programme which acquires and releases
stocks with a view to stabilising market prices for both
producers and consumers. This approach permits
some government intervention through the use of food
aid and domestic stocks to avoid the distress caused by
sharp fluctuations in price. But it permits the market
to establish the long-run equilibrium price, and thus
prevents distortions in either demand or supply. This
is feasible wherever the country needs to import a
portion of its total domestic supply, but lacks financial
resources to import adequate amounts. Of course, in
countries which are self-sufficient at adequate levels of
per capita consumption, governments should be able
to operate procurement and price stabilisation
programmes entirely from domestic supplies.
To summarise, economic constraints to effective
utilisation of food aid can be overcome in three ways:
through the use of food aid for demand-creating,
targeted distribution programmes; through the sale of
food aid at subsidised prices for consumers and use of
the proceeds to finance farm price supports; and
through creating food security reserves to stabilise
prices at market equilibrium. However, each approach
requires management skills and political commitment
to an agriculture-based growth strategy.
Practical Implications
Two classes of countries continue to require food aid.
One is the group of middle-income countries which are
beginning to solve their more serious food problems,
but still need balance of payments support. For the
most part, these countries should be reaching the point
where they can manage targeted food distribution
programmes without external assistance. However, to
maintain the level of cereal imports necessary to
supply domestic markets at stable prices, these
countries may need concessional assistance from time
to time. The amount of assistance required will
fluctuate from year to year, according to the level of
domestic crop production and volume of cereal
imports required, the level of world cereal prices, and
the levels of export earnings and foreign exchange
reserves in relation to the value of total import
requirements and debt servicing obligations. Since the
amount required will fluctuate from year to year, the
most appropriate form of support is programme aid
where food commodities are sold on the open market
and proceeds are used for general budgetary support
in a policy environment conducive to agricultural
growth.
Constraints on increasing food aid to this group of
countries may include the inappropriateness of food
aid commodities for local markets, lack of handling
capacity for additional imports, pricing policies which
subsidise urban consumption but do not stimulate
domestic production, and marketing systems which
hinder the free flow of local cereals from production
centres to market centres. Also, because of the
fluctuating nature of the balance of payments
situation, it is not possible to project a smooth trend in
the amount of each individual country's food aid
requirement.
The other class of countries requiring food aid is the
low-income group where inadequate levels of
domestic food production and lack of purchasing
power combine to depress consumption for large
numbers of poor people. Until these countries
graduate to a higher income status, it can be assumed
that they face pressing balance of payments problems,
and that imports of cereals will have to be financed
primarily with concessional or grant assistance. The
amount of food aid required will therefore be the
amount of additional imports needed to bring per
capita consumption up to a minimum nutritional
standard for different sexes, age groups, and activity
levels. This amount equals the difference between
domestic production and the total supply required to
meet effective market demand plus unsatisfied
nutritional needs. In low-income countries there will
be a continuing requirement for food aid until per
capita incomes reach higher levels. Multi-year
commitments could therefore be envisioned at levels
equal to the anticipated gap between desired
consumption and trend production, with some
provision for a gradual increase in commercial
imports as the balance of payments situation
improves, and annual adjustments which respond to
fluctuations in production.
Since the primary objective of food aid in low-income
countries is to improve nutritional status by increasing
demand and supply simultaneously, the most
appropriate form of support is project aid, where
commodities are used to finance targeted food
subsidies or distribution programmes which reach the
poor directly with additional food. As pointed out
above, this approach could be managed to benefit the
malnourished with relatively little effect on domestic
market prices. In addition, projects which are seasonal
or which vary in size with local production conditions
also reduce risk for small farmers and landless
labourers by providing an income supplement when
harvests are poor, or when food prices are high. 12 This
contribution to rural stability can have important
long-run benefits for agricultural growth and
development.
Programme aid can be used to complement targeted
food distribution projects through the generation of
complementary resources needed to finance admini-
strative and transport costs and complementary
development-related activities in rural areas. In
addition, some low-income countries will also require
programme aid as balance of payments support from
time to time. However, for low-income countries, an
approach which provides programme aid for cereal
imports sold in urban markets without taking into
account the needs of the rural poor is not likely to
contribute to development, and may well hinder it.
In many low-income countries marketing systems are
not well-developed and price policies do not serve the
interests of farmers. Food aid can facilitate policy
reform by providing a food security cushion. With a
small back-up reserve, governments can introduce
price and procurement policies which allow markets
to operate freely within a price band which protects
the interests of both consumers and producers.
'2i ¡s particularly important for farmers who do not produce
enough to feed their own families without additional purchases.
Such farmers often sell their crops at harvest when prices are low in
order to repay debts. Subsequently, they must purchase food when
market prices are high, necessitating new debt. Judicious food aid
programming can help break this vicious cycle.
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Constraints on increasing food aid to low-income
countries may include the high administrative cost of
targeted programmes and lack of local management
personnel, lack of data on the nutritional status and
consumption behaviour of intended beneficiaries,
unsuitability of food aid commodities for local diets,
and rigid marketing systems and price policies which
tax producers for the benefit of consumers. If data and
management constraints can be removed, narrowly-
targeted programmes may achieve their objective of
improving nutritional status, even though government
policies are not oriented toward rural development.
But broader subsidy programmes or projects which
use food aid in support of development-related
activities are not likely to achieve their objectives over
the long-term unless the policy constraint is also
removed.
These constraints suggest that food aid cannot
actually be used in the amounts projected. Neverthe-
less, the projections provide a clear indication of need,
particularly in the low-income countries where the
hunger problem is most serious. The extent to which
various constraints prevent countries from absorbing
the quantities of food aid which they appear to need
will differ from country to country. Further, even if
the presence of various constraints can be clearly
identified, their effect on capacity to use additional
food aid effectively is difficult to quantify.
An alternative approach for estimating food aid
requirements for individual countries on an annual
basis would avoid this problem by simply starting with
the existing programme level and asking, first, is the
quantity now being received effectively utilised?
Second, if yes, how much additional quantity could be
effectively utilised, and in what kinds of programmes?
Third, if no, could the same or a larger quantity be
effectively utilised in some other programme mode? In
countries where existing levels are small, and represent
primarily aid to targeted distribution programmes,
sizeable increases over this very low base might be
envisioned, providing some agency is prepared to
accept the administrative responsibility. In countries
with well-established distribution networks and
adequate handling capacity to move grain from port
to rural markets, sizeable increases in food aid to
support dual price systems, food security reserves, and
market reforms could also be envisioned. In countries
which lack good transport networks, where rural
markets are not well-integrated with urban centres,
where there are few distribution centres from which
targeted programmes can operate, food aid can only
increase as complementary resources are provided to
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overcome these constraints. Assuming these countries
are moving toward a favourable policy environment,
food aid increases could be programmed in increments
of, say, lOper cent a year, along with programming of
other development assistance resources to assure
effective use of the food aid.
While it may seem strange to suggest gradual increases
in food aid levels when the ultimate objective is to
phase it out, the growth process which will ultimately
free low-income countries from dependence on food
aid will not be accomplished within the next decade. If
programme planning begins now for incremental
increases in food aid leading to levels of the order of
magnitude of those suggested above for 1990, it will be
from that point that the growth process can really take
off and the eventual phase-out occur. The record of
today's middle-income countries suggests that this
transformation can be accomplished, although the
importance of a growth strategy which emphasises
rural development is probably even greater today than
it was 20 years ago.
To use food aid effectively while pursuing such a
strategy requires a strong commitment from recipient
countries. Equally important, however, are the
commitments donor countries must make to avoid
using their food resource in counterproductive ways.
These commitments include: need-based allocation
policies, simpler approval procedures, aid timely
deliveries.
There is a case for increasing food aid to almost triple
the current volume, with about 90 per cent of the total
going to low-income countries. But the justification
rests on the proposition that both recipients and
donors will commit themselves to policies which
assure that the food aid will be used in the service of
long-term agricultural development and economic
growth. Once need has beeñ established, the extent of
this commitment should therefore determine the
amounts and allocations of food aid increases. While
political objectives and supply management con-
siderations both enter into the food aid allocation
process, it is not unrealistic to suppose that donors
would agree to programme any increases above
current levels according to developmental criteria.
With grain surpluses again accumulating it is timely to
focus attention on ways to improve food aid
programming to meet immediate human needs and to
contribute to the eventual elimination of world
hunger.
For references see page 61.
